Public and private sector wages of male workers in Germany by DUSTMANN, Christian & VAN SOEST, Arthur
Economics Department
Public and Private Sector Wages 
of Male Workers in Germany
C hristian Dustmann
and



























































































































































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 97/13
Public and Private Sector Wages of 
Male Workers in Germany
C h r is t ia n  D u s t m a n n
and
ARTHUR VAN SOEST




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the authors.
©Christian Dustmann and Arthur van Soest 
Printed in Italy in May 1997 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 

































































































First version: March 1995; Revised: March 1997
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze several statistical assumptions used in em­
pirical models on public -  private sector wage structures. Based on data 
for Germany, which contain a large range of background variables usu­
ally not available in other studies, we investigate the sensitivity of the 
results to various specification and identification assumptions. The stan­
dard switching regression model is extended to allow for endogeneity of 
education level, experience, and hours worked. These extensions lead 
to considerably different parameter estimates. We compute and com­
pare conditional and unconditional wage differentials between the public 
and the private sector for the various specifications. These differentials 
are sensitive to exclusion restrictions on regressors, but robust across 
specifications which do and do not allow for endogeneity of education, 
experience, and hours worked.
*We are grateful to Richard Disney for useful comments. Research of the second author 
is made possible by a fellowship of the Netherlands Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(KNAW).
^University College and Institute for Fiscal Studies, London; e-mail: uctpb21@ucl.ac.uk 






















































































































































































In recent years, public sector employment conditions and the efficiency of the 
public sector versus the private sector has become an important policy issue, 
and a number of empirical studies on the wage structure in the two sectors has 
emerged. While the early studies use least squares to compute and compare 
coefficients of wage equations and predicted wages for the two sectors (Smith 
(1976), Gunderson (1979), Shapiro and Stelcner (1989), and Peng (1992) for 
example), the more recent literature typically uses switching regression models 
to take account of possible non-random sector selection. For example, Van der 
Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) analyze public-private sector employment for the 
Ivory Coast, Belman and Heywood (1989) for the US, Stelcner et al. (1989) for 
Peru, Brunello and Rizzi (1993) for Italy, Theeuwes et al. (1985), van Ophem 
(1993) and Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) for the Netherlands, Zweimuller and 
Winter-Ebmer (1994) for Austria, Gindling (1991) for Costa Rica, and Terrell 
(1993) for Haiti.
These studies address the following questions: First, what are the dif­
ferences in the pay structure between the two sectors. Second, what are the 
conditional and unconditional wage differentials between the sectors. Third, 
what determines the selection in the private and the public sector. Conclu­
sions vary considerably across the countries analyzed. This may reflect that 
wage structures, incentives and selection mechanisms between public and pri­
vate sector differ across countries, which is reasonable in view of the divergent 
institutional settings for private and public sector occupations.
Conclusions sometimes also differ between studies for the same country, 
however. A reason for this could be that results are sensitive to model assump­
tions. Non-parametric identification of structural selection and wage equations 
requires exclusion restrictions on variables in both equations. In many studies, 
the data do not provide suitable instruments, and identification assumptions are 
sometimes dubious. For example, some studies use different education measures 
in the wage equations and in the selection equation, or age in one equation and 
potential experience in the other. Belman and Heywood (1989) use continuous 
measures of education in the wage regression and degrees in the selection equa­
tion. Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) and Stelcner et al. (1989) do the 
opposite.
Furthermore, other regressors are assumed exogenous throughout the anal­



























































































predictor for sector choice is education. Nearly all studies find that education 
has a strong positive effect on the probability of working in the public sector. 
But specific occupations in both sectors require specific types of education. It 
is therefore likely that individuals meet the sector decision together with part 
of their educational choice, and that the effect of education on sector choice is 
not structural, but due to unobserved heterogeneity.
In this paper, we attempt to analyze the sensitivity of the results to iden­
tification assumptions of the selection equation, and exogeneity assumptions of 
variables like education, labor market experience, and hours worked. We use 
data from the German Socio Economic Panel, which contains background in­
formation on parents’ social and economic status and thus provides a rich set of 
instruments. We first investigate the sensitivity of coefficients in selection and 
wage equations to exogeneity assumptions. We then compute conditional and 
unconditional wage differentials for a number of specifications, which include 
those usually used in the literature. Comparing results based upon one data set 
allow us to assess to which extent the divergence in findings in the literature is 
due to differences in specifications.
We find that exogeneity of education in the selection equation is rejected. 
This changes the conclusions about the effect of education on sector choice. It 
also questions the use of education for identification. We find that the assump­
tion of exogeneity of education leads to a downward bias of the educational 
coefficients in the wage regressions. We also reject exogeneity of hours worked 
and experience. For the wage differentials, the most dramatic differences are 
found between models which do and do not take sector selection into account. 
Furthermore, if we delete the variables from the selection equation that drive 
identification, we find considerably different conditional wage differentials. Con­
clusions about conditional and unconditional wage differentials appear to be 
robust with respect to the exogeneity assumptions.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the data. 
Section 3 describes the econometric model. The estimation results are discussed 
in section 4. Section 5 analyses wage differentials, and section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 




























































































German nationality.1 We combine information from the first (1984) and third 
(1986) wave of the panel.2
The public sector in Germany distinguishes between two types of employ­
ees: civil servants proper (Beamte) and blue and white collar public sector 
employees. Civil servants account for about 41% of all public sector employees. 
Although civil servants are not allowed to involve actively in wage negotiations, 
their wage increases are strongly linked to the results of wage negotiations of 
other public sector employees. The type of work of civil servants and other state 
employees is similar, except for some jobs reserved for civil servants only. Pay 
scales are the same and apply to all public sector workers at the federal, state 
and local level (see Brandes et al, 1990). We therefore shall not distinguish 
between the two categories of public sector employees in the empirical work. 
We define the public sector as civil servants and other public sector employees, 
and our sample contains 1306 employees in the private sector and 560 in the 
public sector.
Table Al in the Appendix describes the variables used for the analysis and 
Table A2 provides summary statistics for private and public sector employees. 
The education level variable is ordered, with values 1 to 6. It is constructed 
from detailed information about educational background. On average, public 
sector employees have a stronger educational background than private sector 
employees. Public sector employees are somewhat older and more experienced 
than private sector employees. Private sector employees work, on average, eight 
hours per month more than public sector employees, whereas their hourly earn­
ings are lower.
Various retrospective family background variables are used, reflecting the 
labor market status of the father when the child was aged 15, whether the 
mother participated in the labor market or not, age of father and mother when 
the individual was born, and education level of father and mother.
*For females, the participation decision should be taken into account, and this requires 
a different model. Immigrants are strongly underrepresented in the public sector because of 
access restrictions. Furthermore, their wage structure differs from that of native Germans 
(see Dustmann (1993)), and a separate analysis would be needed to take account of that.
2We construct most variables from the first wave which provides information about actual 
labor market experience, allowing us to distinguish between cohort and experience effects in 
the selection equation. The third wave gives information about the family background and 




























































































3 The Econometric Model
We model the choice between public and private sector work and the hourly 
wage rate in the chosen sector. For reasons explained above, we want to allow for 
endogeneity of the education level. We add an equation to explain this variable, 
in which education levels of the parents are the main explanatory variables. 
Allowing for other endogenous regressors (such as hours worked or experience) 
is discussed below. We first present the model in which these other variables 
are exogenous. This model consists of four equations, explaining education 
level, sector selection (i.e. the choice between public and private sector), and 
(potential) hourly earnings in the two sectors.
Education Level
Education levels are coded from 1 to 6, in ascending order (see Table A l), and 
modeled as an ordered probit:3
E '= X e /3e + u e ; E  =  j  if m,j-i < E* < rrij for j  = 1 ,....6 , (1)
where E  denotes the educational level attained, and E ' is a latent variable. 
The vector of explanatory variables X e contains information concerning the 
parents (see next section for details). Assumptions on the error term ue are 
given below. The boundaries satisfy —oo = mo < m \ < ... < ms < m6 =  oo. 
By means of normalization, we assume m\ =  1.5 and ms =  5.5; m 2 , m 3  and m4 
are parameters to be estimated.
Selection
We model the binary choice between private sector (5  =  0) and public sector 
work (S  = 1). The equation for the underlying latent variable is given by
5* =  X s Ps +  D E 6 e +  Us , (2)




























































































which relates to S  as
S  = {0 : S* < 01 : 5* > 0 .
The vector X s  of explanatory variables includes, for example, the father’s 
occupational group. The vector D E  contains dummies for the five highest 
education levels. Many studies follow a more structural approach and allow the 
wage differential between public and private sector wage to enter the selection 
equation explicitly. We experimented with that and found that the coefficient 
of the wage differential could not be estimated accurately (see Dustmann and 
Van Soest, 1995). Moreover, it appeared to be sensitive to which variables are 
excluded from the selection equation. Finally, since mobility between the two 
sectors is extremely low,4 a life cycle wage differential would be more appropriate 
than the current wage differential. Our experiments with this did not lead 
to convincing results either, however. We therefore do not include the wage 
differential in this study.
Wage Rates
Potential before tax hourly wage rates are modeled for the private and public 
sector separately:
where j  = 0 and j  = 1 denote the private and public sector, respectively, 
and X w  contains explanatory variables such as age and experience.
D istribution o f Error Terms
The vector of error terms u = (uE, us, Uy, u i)' is assumed to be independent of 
all explanatory variables in X E, X s , X w and multivariate normal with mean 
zero and covariance matrix E. By means of normalization, E(2,2) =  Var(us) 
is set equal to one. E(3,4) =  Cov(uQ, ui) is not identified. The other elements 
of E (three variances and five covariances) can be estimated.
4 Less than one percent of all employees changed sector in each of the years 1984 till 1987. 
See Blossfeld and Becker (1989) for the various restrictions on changes between both sectors.




























































































If E ( l ,j )  =  0, j  =  2,3,4, the model simplifies to the standard switching 
regression model used in numerous studies. The model can be estimated using 
Heckman’s two stage estimator, or alternatively, by maximum likelihood (ML). 
The latter is straightforward and leads to consistent and asymptotically efficient 
estimates. If ue is correlated with us, u0, or m , ML can be applied to the system 
of four equations as a whole.
Endogeneity of Continuous Variables
In the discussion above, it has been assumed that X e , X s , and X w  contain 
exogenous variables only. There are good reasons, however, to allow for endo­
geneity of some of their components. Following Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993), 
we allow the wage rate to depend upon hours worked. Since hours worked, 
according to labor supply theory, may depend upon the wage rate, it seems 
reasonable to allow for endogeneity of hours worked. Furthermore, actual expe­
rience is included in the wage equations. If the education level is endogeneous, 
it seems reasonable to allow for endogeneity of experience as well, since those 
with more years of full-time education will usually have fewer years of labour 
market experience.
One way to take account of the potential endogeneity of continuous vari­
ables like hours worked and experience is to estimate reduced form equations 
by OLS, with only exogenous variables on the right hand side. The OLS resid­
uals are then added as regressors to the four equations of the model introduced 
above, which can be estimated by ML. This is based on the assumption of joint 
normality of the error terms in the auxiliary equations and the error terms 
u =  (ue, us, u0, Ui )'. This assumption implies that, conditional upon the errors 
in the auxiliary equations, u is multivariate normal with fixed covariance matrix 
and with a mean which is linear in the errors of the auxiliary equations.
Significance levels of the residuals can be used to test for endogeneity (see 
Smith and Blundell, 1986). If exogeneity is rejected, however, the standard 
errors of the parameter estimates have to be corrected for the fact that the 
residuals are estimated. An alternative is to estimate the system as a whole by 
ML, including the auxiliary equations. This is the procedure we follow. It leads 
to efficient parameter estimates and to consistent estimates of their standard 
errors.5
5 An appendix with details on the likelihood is available upon request from the authors. 





























































































For model identification, we need exclusion restrictions. In the wage equations, 
we exclude all parental characteristics, thus assuming that correlation between 
ability and observed parental characteristics only comes about through selection 
and education level. In the selection equation, we exclude education levels of 
the parents to identify endogeneity of education, but we do retain the parents’ 
occupational group variables. To identify the model which allows for endogene­
ity of hours worked, we included interest income, mortgage payment liabilities, 
and family composition variables in the hours equation. These variables are not 
included in the other equations. The reduced form equation for actual experi­
ence includes the variables on parental education and employment status. To 
obtain parsimonious specifications, we excluded more variables from the equa­
tions, imposing restrictions which could not be rejected according to likelihood 
ratio tests.6
4 Estim ation Results
We consider 11 different specifications. Differences between models 1 to 9 relate 
to different zero restrictions on the covariance matrix of all the error terms (u 
and the errors in the two auxiliary reduced form equations for hours worked and 
experience), and to whether hours worked is included as a regressor in the wage 
equations or not. Apart from that, these models contain the same regressors in 
all the equations. The choice of regressors is based upon preliminary estimations 
to obtain a parsimonious specification, particularly for the auxiliary equations 
explaining education level, hours worked, and experience. Models 10 and 11 use 
different regressors in one of the equations. In particular, model 11 excludes the 
parental background variables and is therefore similar to most specifications in 
the literature. Models 10 and 11 are used to analyze the sensitivity of the wage 
differentials for the choice of regressors, and are discussed in the next section.
[Table 1 about here]
Raphson iteration in the direction of the likelihood maximum leads to an estimator which is 
asymptotically equivalent to ML.
6For example, the parents’ levels of education were insignificant in the sector choice equa­




























































































Table 1 presents models 1 to 9. Models 1 to 8 are nested in model 9. 
This is a generalized switching regression model which allows for endogeneity 
of education level, hours worked, and experience.7 The number of parameter 
restrictions in models 1 to 8 and the likelihood difference with model 9 are 
presented in the final two columns of Table 1. Likelihood ratio tests based on 
this table lead to the conclusion that these models are rejected against model 
9. Moreover, for all pairs of models that are nested, the more restrictive model 
is rejected against the more general one.8
We do not present detailed estimation results for all models. We focus 
on the differences between the results for the standard switching regression 
model, the common model in the literature (although identification is sometimes 
weaker, see below), and the most general model, preferred according to Table 
1. For the three equations of interest (choice between public and private sector, 
wages in the private sector, and wages in the public sector), we present the 
results for models 6 and 9, and briefly mention some findings for the other 
models. For the auxiliary equations (education level, hours worked),9 the results 
for all models are very similar, and we only present the estimates for model 9.
We first present the results for the correlation structure of the error terms 
in model 9 (Table 2). The first part of the table presents the correlation matrix 
of u, conditional upon the errors in the auxiliary equations.10 p(us,u i) is pos­
itive and significant. p(us, Uq) is positive, but smaller and insignificant. These 
results are similar for the other models allowing for selectivity. Along the lines 
of Roy (1951), this indicates that the mean wage of those who work in the public 
sector is larger than the expected public sector wage of an arbitrary individual 
with the same observed characteristics. Positive selection into the public sec­
tor, but no selection into the private sector, is also found by van Ophem (1993) 
and Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993). Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) find 
positive selection into both sectors.11
7In all models, we impose zero correlation between errors in the experience and hours 
worked equations. Relaxing this in model 9 yields an estimate of the correlation coefficient 
close to zero, with t-value 0.03.
8Unless stated otherwise, we use a significance level of 5 percent.
9The results for the experience equation are available upon request.
^Conditioning corrects for spurious correlation through the errors in the hours worked 
and experience equations. The unconditional correlations have the same sign and similar 
significance levels in all cases.




























































































[Table 2 about here]
We also find a significantly positive estimate of p{us, ue). This confirms 
our conjecture that education is endogenous to the choice between the public 
and the private sector. The correlation between ue and the errors in the wage 
equations is negative, and significant for the public sector. This may reflect 
an errors in variables problem, due to imperfect measurement of the education 
level.
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents the covariances of u with the errors 
in the equations for hours of work (uh) and experience (ux), again for model 
9. C ov(u e , u x ) is strongly negative, since those with high education level enter 
the labor market later, and thus have lower experience. It is not clear why 
Cov(us, Ux) is also negative. The negative sign of Cov(us, uh) may reflect that 
working overtime is less common in the public sector than in the private sector, 
and corresponds to the difference in average hours worked between the two 
sectors in the raw data. The negative correlations between uh and the errors 
in the wage equations can reflect measurement error in hours, since the wage 
rate is the ratio of earnings and hours worked.
Choice between Private and Public Sector
In Table 3, we present the results for the selection equation in the standard 
model (model 6) and the general model (model 9). The main difference be­
tween the two models is to allow the education level to be endogenous in model 
9, which is reflected in the estimates: those for the educational dummies are 
substantially different, while the other slope parameters are similar in terms of 
sign, magnitude and significance level. If education level is taken exogenous, 
the probability of being in the public sector increases with education, a com­
mon finding in the literature. An exception is level 5, which measures training 
specific to jobs that are typically found in the private sector. If endogeneity of 
education is allowed for, however, the positive relation between public sector 
choice and education disappears. What remains is a negative effect of education 
level 5. The interpretation is that the positive relation between education level 
and public sector choice found in the standard model, is due to unobserved 
heterogeneity instead of a structural effect. This casts doubt on the results in 
other studies on the effect of education on sectorial choice. It also suggests that 
estimates of wage equations might be biased, since correction for selectivity is




























































































often identified through the use of different specifications of the educational 
variables in selection and wage equations.
[Table 3 about here]
We allow for a piece-wise linear age pattern.12 The probability of working 
in the public sector increases with age, particularly for younger cohorts. The 
lack of mobility between sectors suggests that this is a cohort effect rather than 
a pure age effect. None of the age terms is significant, however.
The variables on the father’s occupation are excluded from the wage equa­
tions and are therefore important for identification. Those whose father was a 
civil servant have a significantly higher probability to have a public sector job 
than others, and in particular than those whose father had a blue-collar or no 
job (the reference group).
Wage Equations
Estimates for public and private sector wage equations are given in Table 4, 
again for models 6 and 9. Both models yield similar results for marital status 
and blue versus white collar workers, but the results differ in most other respects. 
Compared to white collar workers, blue collar workers earn about 7% less in the 
public sector, but 16% in the private sector (ceteris paribus). As common in 
the wage literature, we find that married men earn more than unmarried men. 
We find that this differential is larger in the public than in the private sector.
[Table 4 about here]
The other coefficients show substantial differences between models 6 and 
9. For example, the effect of hours worked on the (before tax) hourly wage rate 
is significantly negative for both sectors according to model 6. A negative effect 
of hours worked on wages is also found by Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993). It 
becomes significantly positive, however, if endogeneity of hours worked is al­
lowed for. This confirms the importance of correcting for the division bias due 
to measurement error in hours worked. The positive sign corresponds to the 
notion that the wage rate for working overtime is higher than the regular wage 
rate. The effect seems quite high. Perhaps this is due the lack of explanatory 
power in the hours equation (see below), which implies that the normality as­
sumption may be important for identification. To find out whether this has





























































































any effects on the wage differentials in the next section, we have also estimated 
models which exclude hours of work from the wage rate equation.
For both specifications and sectors, the wage increases with education 
level. In the general model, the impact of education level is stronger than 
in the models which do not allow for endogeneity of education. This holds 
particularly for the public sector, where the education differentials are larger 
than in the private sector.
We have included a quadratic function of both age and actual experi­
ence. Including age terms apart from experience terms leads to a significant 
improvement of the likelihood. The age variables may reflect both cohort and 
life cycle effects. Still, age and experience are strongly correlated, and it seems 
too much to ask from the data to identify them separately, certainly if experi­
ence is allowed to be endogenous. This may explain why we find an implausible 
negative experience pattern in the private sector according to model 9. In this 
model also, we find that age would play no role in the public sector, though it 
is significantly positive in the private sector.
[Figure 1 about here]
In figure 1, we have combined the information on age and experience. 
Expected log wage rates according to model 9 in both sectors are sketched 
as a function of education level and age.13 Experience is replaced by its best 
linear prediction, given age and education level. Other variables are set equal 
to their sample means. For public sector wages an increasing pattern emerges. 
Private sector wages show a much flatter pattern for both models. For young 
workers with little experience, the private sector pays much better than the 
public sector. For the oldest age group, the difference is negligible. For model 
6, a similar pattern evolves, but education differentials smaller than in model 
9, particularly in the public sector.
Hours Worked and Education
Table 5a reports the results of the education, and table 5b for the hours equa­
tion. In the former, both the father’s and the mother’s education have a sig­
nificant positive effect, with that of the father being more important. The 
occupational category of the father also matters: if he was a civil servant, this 
improves education (no father or father is blue collar worker is the reference




























































































group). Age is again incorporated as a linear spline functions, accounting for 
cohort effects in a flexible way. It appears that educational achievement is 
relatively low for those who started their education during the second world
[Tables 5a and 5b about here]
Hours worked for pay are positively related to mortgage liabilities, a typ­
ical negative income effect (Table 5b). The effect of interest income, however, 
is insignificant. The number of children is positively related to hours worked, 
a finding which is not unusual in the literature on male labor supply. It may 
be related to the negative effect of children on female labor supply. If the wife 
withdraws from the labor market, the husband works more to compensate for 
the income loss. An explanation for the negative effect of the father’s education 
may be that higher education of the father increases the individual’s expected 
education level, and paid overtime is less common among the higher educated. 
Age has a negative effect, as expected.
5 Wage Differentials
In this section we discuss two types of wage differentials (see, e.g., Heckman 
(1990) for a discussion of various definitions). First, we consider the expected 
wage rates in the public and the private sector for reference individuals, with 
given age and education level. These are based upon the estimated systematic 
parts of the wage equations, and no account is taken of the error terms. Second, 
we will look at average differentials between potential public and private wages 
for all workers, and for workers in the public and private sector. This is based 
upon simulations which take account of the full structure of the model.
On top of the models 1 to 9 discussed above, we consider two alterna­
tive models. Model 10 differs from model 9 in the specification of the wage 
equations: it does not include experience or its square, but includes the more 
flexible age piece-wise linear pattern also used in other equations. This is be­
cause experience is replaced by its prediction for most purposes anyhow, and 
it is not clear whether including experience and allowing for its endogeneity is 
worthwhile. The likelihood of model 10 is slightly smaller than that of model 9. 
Model 11 is the standard model (model 6) without parental characteristics in 
the sector selection equation. This model is rejected against model 6. The main 




























































































significantly negative, while it is insignificant and positive according to models 
6 and 9 (see Table 2). Model 11 is of interest since it is similar to most studies 
in the literature, which do not use parental characteristics for identification. 
Identification of this model relies on normality of the error terms.14
Table 6 shows the estimated wage differentials for some reference individ­
uals. The base case is a 35 years old male with education level 2 (the mode of 
the education levels). The other individuals considered have the same age but 
a different education level, or another age but the same education level. In all 
cases, experience is replaced by its prediction based upon age and education. 
Other variables are set equal to their sample means. The computation of the 
wage differentials is thus in line with that of the wage rates in Figure 1.
For the base case, we find a negative wage differential of more than thirty 
percent for most models. Only for models 1 and 5, which do not allow for corre­
lation between the error terms in the selection and the wage equations, the size 
of the differential is much smaller, though it remains negative and significant. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the other cases. Wage differentials are 
significantly negative for all education levels except the highest, for 11 models 
other than models 1 and 5. Model 11, with its substantially different selection 
equation based upon weaker identifying assumptions, leads to smaller differen­
tials than other models allowing for selectivity. According to all models, the 
wage differentials decrease with age, but the pattern differs across specifications. 
For example, according to model 2, the standard model without hours worked, 
the differential between age 25 and age 35 is substantial and almost as large as 
that between age 35 and 45. In model 9 on the other hand, there is hardly any 
difference between wage differentials at age 25 and age 35, but the differential 
at age 45 is much smaller.
[Table 6 about here]
All models show that the differentials are largest for the two lowest educa­
tion levels, and smallest for the highest level. Differences between differentials 
for education levels 1 and 2 are small in all but the two ’simplest’ models 1 
and 5, and the sign of this difference varies with the model. A similar remark 
applies to differences between differentials for education levels 3, 4 and 5.
14In model 11, the age pattern in the selection equation is different from that in the wage 
equations. In principle, this also helps for identification. We also estimated model 11 with 
the piecewise linear age pattern in the wage equations (as in model 10). Resulting wage 




























































































^Frorn Table 1 we concluded that model 6 is strongly rejected against the 
more general model 9, and is therefore misspecified. In spite of this, we find 
that the estimates of the wage differentials are quite similar. On the other 
hand, the differences with model 11 show that the results are rather sensitive to 
the specification of the selection equation, and the use of identifying exclusion 
restrictions therein.
Aggregate wages and wage differentials based upon simulations using the 
complete model, are presented in Table 7.15 We consider unconditional and 
conditional wage predictions. The unconditional (public or private sector) pre­
diction is defined as the average16 predicted value of the (public or private) wage 
rate for all individuals in the sample. It estimates E{lnW j}, j  =  0,1, the mean 
prior to the choice of sector. The conditional wage prediction is a weighted sam­
ple average of the predictions of all individuals in the sample, where the weights 
are the estimated sector probabilities of the sectors. It estimates the means for 
given sector choices: E {lnW 0\S = 0}, E {lnW i\S  =  1}, E{lnW 0\S = 1} and 
E {lnW i\S  = 0). The former two reflect the sample means of private and pub­
lic sector workers, while the latter two are the so-called counter-factuals which 
have no observed counterpart. Thus E {lnW \\S  =  0} is the expected potential 
public sector wage for an arbitrary private sector worker, etc.
[Table 7 about here]
The first three rows refer to the unconditional wages. According to all 
models, potential wages in the private sector exceed those in the public sector, 
on average. For the private sector wage, predictions for models 1, 5, and partic­
ularly 11 are lower than for the other models. For the public sector wage, the 
models in which selectivity is not accounted for (models 1 and 5) yield higher 
public sector wage predictions than the other models, with differences of more 
than 20 percent.
The other rows refer to conditional wage predictions. Row 4 is the average
15These differentials are conceptually similar to those in Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993). Due 
to endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables, however, we cannot use their formulas 
and rely on simulations. These are straightforward: we compute the systematic part using the 
parameter estimates, and add error terms drawn from the estimated error term distribution 
for all individuals. To compute the corresponding standard errors, we repeat this procedure 
for 100 draws of the complete parameter vector from the estimated asymptotic distribution 
of the estimator. Fortran programs are available upon request.




























































































wage in the private sector of people who choose to work in the private sector. 
All these predictions are very similar: each model reproduces the average wage 
rate in the private sector rather well. Similarly, row 8 reproduces public sector 
wages of public sector workers.
The predictions in rows 5 and 7 have no observed sample equivalent. Row 
5 refers to the wages that private sector workers could have received if they 
had worked in the public sector. Similarly, row 7 presents potential private 
sector wages of public sector workers. These rows reveal much larger differences 
between the models than rows 4 and 8. In row 5, the main differences again 
concern models 1 and 5 versus all others. Row 7 shows that model 11 predicts 
much smaller private sector wages of public sector workers than all other models. 
This relates to the large negative estimate of p(us, ito) for this model.
According to model 6, potential wages of private sector workers are about 
7.5% lower than according to the general model 9. Taking into account the 
standard errors of these predictions, however, this difference is not very large.
Those who selected themselves into the private sector (rows 3 and 4) 
are those with lower potential wages in both sectors. This is due to both 
observed and unobserved characteristics: from Tables 3 and 4, for example, we 
conclude that age is negatively correlated with selection into the private sector, 
but positively with wages in both sectors. Accordingly, those who work in the 
public sector do better in both sectors than the average individual.
There are some remarkable differences between the various specifications. 
The numbers in row 6 show that private sector workers would be worse off in 
the public sector. This difference is much smaller in the models 1 and 5 than in 
the other models. For those who actually work in the public sector, the average 
wage differential is smaller than for those who work in the private sector (row 
9). Again, differentials are smaller if selection effects are not incorporated. The 
largest negative differential is found for the most general model (model 9) and 
amounts to about 18 percent. More importantly, the differential changes sign 
for model 11. This is due to the low predictions for potential private sector 
earnings of public sector workers in row 7.
If gross wages were the only criterion for sector choice, then the negative 
average differentials for the public sector workers would indicate that the choice 
of many public sector workers is not rational.17 Choosing the public sector, 
however, is also based on tax rules, job security, social security premiums and
17Note that we can only consider the average differential and not the individual variation 




























































































entitlements to unemployment benefits, pension rights, and many other non­
monetary job characteristics.
Wage advantages between sectors are often found to vary across educa­
tional categories or age groups. Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1982), for in­
stance, find that unconditional expected wages in the private sector are high 
for those with low education, but low for those with high education. Hartog 
and Oosterbeek (1993) find that public sector occupations have higher wage 
prospects for all educational groups, while van Ophem (1993) reports that the 
unconditional wage advantage of the public sector diminishes with increasing 
age. We have looked at conditional and unconditional wage differentials for dif­
ferent educational and age groups. The results are in line with those in Tables 
6 and 7.18 Differentials decrease with age and education level, but remain neg­
ative for all models allowing for selectivity. Conditional wage disadvantages for 
public sector workers are always smaller than those for private sector workers.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In the previous sections we have estimated models to analyze public -  pri­
vate sector wage differentials, and sector selection, under various specification 
assumptions. Our main findings are as follows. We reject the common as­
sumption that education is exogenous in the sector choice equation. Allowing 
for endogeneity improves the model significantly, and the effect on the sector 
choice drops to zero in terms of size and significance level. Accordingly, the 
positive correlation between education and sector choice, as found and empha­
sized in most other studies, seems to be driven by unobserved characteristics 
that affect both in the same direction.
Not allowing for endogeneity of the education level results in downward 
biased coefficients in the private sector wage regression. We also reject exo­
geneity of hours worked, and of labor market experience in the wage equation. 
Measurement error in the hours variable is likely to induce a spurious negative 
correlation between hours and wages. The effect of hours worked in the wage 
equation, which is found negative in other studies (see Hartog and Oosterbeek, 
1993), changes sign when allowing for endogeneity.
differential is positive, since Cov(uo,u\) is unidentified, and so is the variance of Uo — Ui-




























































































We compute average, conditional and unconditional wage differentials for 
a number of model specifications. For all educational groups, we find that 
potential wages are on average higher in the private sector than in the public 
sector, but this advantage falls with age and with education level. Predicted 
public sector wages are lower for all education and age groups than predicted 
private sector wages. On average, potential wages of public sector employees 
are higher in the private sector than in the public sector. For private sector 
workers, the wage differential between private and public sector wage would be 
even larger. Selection therefore works in the right direction: on average, the 
public sector workers have a comparative advantage in the public sector.
Results on conditional and unconditional wage differentials are found to 
be remarkably stable across specifications, as long as the way in which selection 
is taken into account remains the same. However, results of models which do 
not account for selectivity due to endogeneity of the choice between public 
and private sector, or of models with a weakly identified selection equation, 
differ quite substantially. This suggests that some differences in the results of 
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Table 1: Model specifications and Likelihood Differences
Model Model Description No of Restrictions Lik. diff.
M l No correlations between errors 
(Hours worked not in wage equations)
15 -471.9
M2 Standard switching regression model 
(Hours worked not in wage equations)
13 -467.4
M3 Education level endogenous 
(Hours worked not in wage equations)
10 -458.5
M4 Educ. level and experience endogenous 
(Hours worked not in wage equations)
6 -455.6
M5 No correlations between errors 
(Hours worked in wage equations)
13 -353.7
M6 Standard switching regression model 
(Hours worked in wage equations)
11 -348.1
M7 Education level endogenous 
(Hours worked in wage equations)
8 -342.6
M8 Educ. level and hours worked endogenous 
(Hours worked in wage equations)
4 -297.1
M9 Educ. level, hours worked, and 
experience endogenous 





























































































Table 2: Correlation Structure, M 9
Correlation matrix of u = (u e , u s , uq, u i ) 
given u h  and ux
U E us wo Ul
U E 1 0.207* -0.128 -0.492*




U H 0.04 -1.24* -1.99* -3.70*
ux -2.61* -0.82* 0.12 0.07





























































































Table 3: Public Sector Choice
Model 6 Model 9
Variable Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
constant pp -2.168 -4.94 -2.093 -4.35
age 15-25 0.724 1.60 0.725 1.51
age 25-35 0.093 0.61 0.261 1.62
age 35-45 0.168 1.35 -0.010 -0.07
age 45-55 0.100 0.72 0.116 0.78
age 55-65 0.142 0.41 0.092 0.25
12par 0.122 1.13 0.147 1.22
f blue -0.019 -0.19 -0.094 -0.88
f white 0.036 0.30 0.251 1.90
f self 0.129 1.08 0.204 1.60
f civil 0.457 3.53 0.721 4.83
m worked 0.340 2.68 0.645 3.95
m no work 0.276 2.14 0.709 4.29
ed level 2 0.181 1.44 -0.195 -1.02
ed level 3 0.697 5.00 0.018 0.06
ed level 4 0.651 3.95 -0.165 -0.52
ed level 5 0.078 0.34 -0.869 -2.19




























































































Table 4: Wage Equations
Private Sector Public Sector
Model 6 Model 9 Model 6 Model 9
Variable Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
constant 3.589 28.20 1.592 2.56 3.679 13.75 0.541 0.62
ed level 2 0.116 3.87 0.172 3.51 0.027 0.51 0.271 4.49
ed level 3 0.198 4.15 0.305 3.67 0.201 3.55 0.613 7.23
ed level 4 0.342 6.19 0.459 4.74 0.378 5.66 0.837 8.81
ed level 5 0.379 7.42 0.507 5.14 0.340 3.07 0.909 6.48
ed level 6 0.457 5.55 0.631 4.81 0.640 9.14 1.286 10.41
married 0.081 3.64 0.088 2.94 0.093 3.63 0.119 2.77
Exp/10 0.079 1.48 0.013 0.14 0.236 3.23 0.438 4.35
Exp/10 sqrd -0.033 -3.21 -0.027 -2.36 -0.047 -3.84 -0.037 -2.98
Age/10 0.476 5.61 0.497 3.95 0.257 1.91 -0.123 -0.67
Age/10 sqrd -0.041 -4.32 -0.036 -3.23 -0.016 -1.15 0.003 0.22
blue -0.164 -8.81 -0.157 -8.24 -0.076 -2.54 -0.065 -2.25
hours work -0.012 -17.12 0.032 2.42 -0.019 -11.57 0.061 3.27









































































































age 15-25 1.566 2.89
age 25-35 0.299 1.74
age 35-45 -0.463 -3.40
age 45-55 -0.196 -1.24
age 55-65 0.306 0.78
12par -0.050 -0.41
f blue -0.242 -2.17
f white 0.339 2.55
f self 0.184 1.37
f civil 0.574 3.75
m worked 0.829 6.22
m no work 1.013 7.82
sigma 1.045 43.33
bound 1 1.500 -
bound 2 3.685 69.48
bound 3 4.585 81.42
bound 4 5.213 129.17




























































































Table 5b: Hours Worked, M 9
Variable Coef. t-value







fs 2 -0.879 -2.33
fs 3 -1.189 -2.58
ft 1 -0.217 -0.87
ft 2 -0.543 -0.76





























































































age 35, ed. 1 
age 35, ed. 3 
age 35, ed. 4 
age 35, ed. 5 
age 35, ed. 6
age 35, ed. 2 
age 25, ed. 2 
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Note: first line: estim
ate; second line: standard error
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Table A l: Explanation of Variables
Code Description
public Dummy; 1 if employed in public sector, 0 if in private sector
wage Hourly earnings
log wage Log of Hourly earnings
ed level Ordered variable on education:
ed level 1 basic or intermediate schooling (Haupt/Realschule)
ed level 2 basic schooling and apprenticeship
ed level 3 intermediate schooling and apprenticeship
ed level 4 high school (Gymnasium, Fachhochschule)/high school and apprenticeship
ed level 5 engineering school or higher specific school
ed level 6 university
hours Hours worked per month for pay*
exp Actual Labor Market Experience of Individual 
(constructed from a biographical scheme; after the age of 15).
age Age of Individual
married Dummy; 1 if married
blue Dummy; 1 if blue collar
white Dummy; 1 if white collar
civil Dummy; 1 if civil servant
head Dummy; 1 if individual head of household
mortg Mortgage payments per month
intinc Interest income per month
child number of children younger than 16 in household
fe2 Dummy; 1 if father intermediate schooling
fs3 Dummy; 1 if father high school
ftl Dummy; 1 if father apprenticeship
ft2 Dummy; 1 if father engineering school
ft3 Dummy; 1 if father university
ms2 Dummy; 1 if mother intermediate schooling
ms3 Dummy; 1 if mother high school
mtl Dummy; 1 if mother apprenticeship
mt2 Dummy; 1 if mother engineering school
mt3 Dummy; 1 if mother university
f blue Dummy; 1 if father blue collar
f white Dummy; 1 if father white collar
f civil Dummy; 1 if father civil servant
f self Dummy; 1 if father self employed
12par Dummy; 1 if grown up with father or mother only
m worked Dummy; 1 if mother employed when individual was 15
m no work Dummy; 1 if mother was not employed when individual was 15
* Two variables on hours worked are available: normal hours worked, and actual hours worked 
including overtime. Furthermore, the individual was asked whether overtime work was paid for. 
The variable on hours worked used here measures ea rn in g s-effec tive hours worked and 
was constructed as follows: If the individual reported overtime hours and overtime work is 
paid for, HOURS is constructed on the basis of this measure. In other cases, HOURS 






































































































wage 18.745 7.866 19.741 7.499
log wage 2.865 0.351 2.920 0.350
ed level 2.410 1.143 3.127 1.539
hours 43.148 6.843 41.328 6.101
exp 23.085 11.689 23.463 11.296
age 39.545 11.096 41.570 10.605
married 0.778 0.415 0.787 0.409
blue 0.579 0.493 0.197 0.398
white 0.415 0.493 0.273 0.446
civil 0.000 0.000 0.528 0.499
head 0.892 0.309 0.954 0.208
mortg 259.109 515.379 300.931 521.497
intinc 24.913 186.956 26.826 141.844
child 0.793 0.916 0.733 0.924
fs2 0.079 0.271 0.115 0.320
fs3 0.060 0.238 0.079 0.271
ftl 0.725 0.446 0.731 0.443
ft2 0.019 0.139 0.028 0.166
ft3 0.027 0.163 0.043 0.204
ms2 0.064 0.246 0.104 0.306
ms3 0.019 0.139 0.028 0.166
m tl 0.347 0.476 0.418 0.493
mt2 0.002 0.049 0.009 0.097
mt3 0.006 0.081 0.007 0.086
f blue 0.486 0.500 0.349 0.477
f white 0.120 0.325 0.150 0.357
f civil 0.064 0.244 0.163 0.370
12par 0.131 0.338 0.117 0.322
m worked 0.399 0.489 0.395 0.489





























































































Table A3: Experience, Model 9
Coef. t-value
const exp 3.847 2.41
age 15-25 5.732 3.31
age 25-35 9.203 19.31
age 35-45 10.941 32.29
age 45-55 10.213 26.32
age 55-65 2.052 2.08
married 0.818 3.99
child -0.333 -3.57
fs 2 -0.950 -3.17
fs 3 -1.758 -3.28
ft 1 -0.302 -1.26
ft 2 -1.593 -2.79
ft 3 -2.288 -3.35
ms 2 -0.841 -2.51
ms 3 -1.289 -1.91
mt 1 -0.500 -2.56
mt 2 -0.861 -0.75
mt 3 0.622 0.48
mworked -1.632 -8.72
12 par -1.064 -3.66
f blue 0.438 1.56
f self -0.581 -1.76
f white -0.642 -1.89





























































































7 Appendix: Likelihood of M odel 9
We discuss the likelihood contribution for a public sector worker with education 
level 2. Contributions of other individuals can be derived analogously. For 
given parameter values, observed hours of work, experience, and log wage rate, 
let e//, ex,  and ei denote the residuals in hours, experience, and public sector 
wage equation, respectively. The likelihood contribution is then given by19
L = f h,x ,i{zh ,£x ,e \ ) P [E  =  2 ,S  = l|e //,ex ,e i]  (4)
Here }h,x ,i is the trivariate normal density of {uh , u x , ui )'. This can also 
be written as
L =  fH,x(eH,ex)fi\H,x(ei\eH,ex)P[E =  2 ,5  =  l|ew ,ex,ei] (5)
where fn ,x  is the density of (u/i, ux)  and }\\h,x is the conditional density of 
ui given (uh , ux) =  (e//, ex )- We assume joint normality of (Uh , u x ,Ue , its, u0, tii). 
This implies that the conditional distribution of (ue , us ,Ui ) given (uh, ux) = 
(e//, ex)  is normal with, say, mean /x and covariance matrix E .20
Under the additional assumption that uh and Ux are independent, we 
have /x = C e *, with e* =  (e///<7//, e* /ax) ' ,  the vector of normalized residu­
als. C is then the covariance matrix of (it£,Us,ixi)' and (tx///cq/, u x /fx ) '-  We 
parameterize the error distribution with E, <j h , ax,  and C  (see Table 2).
f HX is a bivariate normal density which reduces to the product of two 
univariate densities if Uh and ux  are independent. f\\n,x can immediately be 
expressed in /x (i.e. C  and e*) and E. Using equations (1) and (2), the condi­
tional probability P [ E  — 2 ,5  =  l|e« ,ex ,e i] can be written as the difference of 
two conditional bivariate cumulative probabilities in terms of ue and u s ■ These 
conditioned probabilities are again bivariate normal; their mean and covariance 
matrix can straightforwardly be expressed in terms of E, /x and e t . Thus the 
likelihood contribution is a simple expression in normal densities and cumulative 
bivariate normal probabilities, and its computation is straightforward.
I9Since the model is recursive, the Jacobean term is equal to 1.
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